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INTRODUCTION
{j)

The parties agree that all surface and groundwaters in Utah belong to the State.
Utah Code Ann. §73-3-1. A water right, then, represents authorization to use the State's

~

water on terms set by the State Engineer. Among those terms are permission to divert
water in priority at a specific point, at a specific rate of flow, up to a specific volume, and
to use it for a specific purpose. Only those attributes of the right established by the State
Engineer are protected by law. Significantly in this case, while Appellees' water rights
recognize their wells as authorized points of diversion, they do not grant Appellees an
ownership interest in the aquifer or a guarantee that water will be available at a particular
depth.
In order to prevail herein, the law requires Appellees to demonstrate that, after
reasonable efforts, they were unable to obtain the authorized volume or flow of water
granted by their rights because of actions by Pineview West. That is their burden as a
matter of both law and logic, but it is a burden they could not carry and chose not to
undertake. Indeed, the trial court found that Snowberry was able to divert from its well
more water and at a much higher rate of flow than authorized, arid there has been no
effort made to draw any water from the Arave well for more than ten years. Fatal to their
claim, Appellees have never, ever measured the amount of water produced by their wells,
and they offered no quantification at all of the amount of water to which they believed
they are entitled but could not receive because of Pineview West. Such proof is essential,
both to demonstrate the fact of interference and to establish the diminished quantity of
water Pineview West would be obligated to replace if interference were established.
1

Git)
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Appellees argue that they do not have to prove actual interference if they show
that Pineview West affected the water table to any degree, while acknowledging at the
same time that the level of water in the aquifer, is not in general decline, changes
seasonally, and is affected by withdrawals from other wells and Appellees' own

~

pumping, all contributing factors they made no attempt to quantify. They claim that the
level of water in an aquifer is one of their protected assets, citing cases about the impact
of interference with free-flowing sources on stream flow rights, but they have never
identified the particular level to which they are entitled. Appellees here posit a universe
in which the first well to tap an aquifer has a protected right to the water table (with no
requirement of reasonableness on the part of that water user), and where all owners of
junior rights commit actionable interference when they pump their wells even if the first
user is still able to divert the full amount of water authorized by the State Engineer.
Appellees' hypothetical universe is an impossible one because all diversions from an
underground aquifer impact that source to some degree. Utah requires a greater level of
proof to establish actionable interference, including a demonstration of actual
interference with a particular water right that persists notwithstanding reasonable and
efficient efforts by the party claiming interference.
Appellees argue interference with the source, the vast water table itself, instead of
attempting to quantify impacts on their specific water rights. They argue, for example,
that the mere fact that their wells fall within a graphic "cone of depression" is
demonstrative of interference. (Appellees' Brief (herein, "BR.") at 8, 34.) It is true the
experts described that concept, but they also testified that the "cone" is not regular in
2
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shape, and that the Appellees' wells which are located within the described radius do not
communicate significantly with each other. 1
Arave actually claims interference with the non-diversion of water. There was no
effort made to pump the Arave well for more than ten years, even though Appellees'
evidence confirms that the well is capable of producing 23-25 gallons per minute
(GPM)2, more than three times the Arave authorized diversion of 6.73 GPM. Non-use
cannot be reasonable use as a matter of law. The Snowberry well has always been
equipped with a single-speed 25 GPM pump, even though 6.73 GPM is the maximum
diversion rate authorized by the State Engineer. Excessive diversion rates are illegal, and
thus cannot be a reasonable use as a matter of law. The experts called by both parties
testified that water has consistently been present and available within the existing cased
depth of both wells, even when Pineview West's irrigation well was in operation. 3
Therefore, failing to equip the Arave well with a pump set at an appropriate depth4, and

1

Appellees' expert Anderson testified to indirect communication. (R.0812). Pineview
West's expert Loughlin testified to "No communication." (R.0714). This was not
baseless speculation, as argued by Appellees (BR., at 34) but is amply borne out by
Appellees' well data that show that pumping of the Snowberry well has little or no effect
on the water level on the Arave well which is located only 400-500 feet away.(R.0841 ).
Clearly, geographical proximity does not prove actual interference
2
The Arave well was tested by Appellees shortly before trial. (Pltf. 's Exhibit 54).
3
Given this consistent evidence and Appellees' graphs showing continued operation of
the Snowberry well and a column of water available in both wells throughout the summer
months, the hyperbolic statements that "Appellees cannot divert their water for up to
three months, while #4 pumps" (BR., at 25), that ''the water is there, possibly hundreds
of feet deeper than where it is before #4 turns on" (Id., at 29), and "[f]or about three
months of every year, the senior rights are inaccessible" (Id., at 30) are not helpful.
4
Appellees elected to use the Arave well for monitoring purposes rather than water
production. That is a choice that bears consequences. The parties' experts both agreed
those uses are not mutually exclusive, and that the Arave well could always have been
3
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refusing to equip the Snowberry well with a correctly sized pump that would even out its
cycles or to set the pump in the existing well at a level where more water can be diverted,
cannot be reasonable use as a matter of law. 5 Appellees have never attempted to measure
or model how the Snowberry well would perform if pumped at its authorized rate of

~

flow. 6 Neither is it reasonable for Appellees to pursue an interference claim based on two
wells, where they elected to keep one well idle for ten years and where, as the trial court
found, they have consistently diverted more water than allowed by the water right from
the other well. Pineview West denies that it has interfered with Appellees' water rights
but submits, in the alternative that, as a matter oflaw, there can be no cause of action for

ii

interference with an illegal use of water. 7

equipped with a pump in addition to the monitoring equipment. (R.1108-1111);
(R.1132).
5 Appellees concede that they, like all other appropriators, must "chase their water" when
necessary. (BR. at, 42, n.45). They made no effort to do so. Where the means of
diversion are inefficient, the priority doctrine does not strictly apply. (Infra, p. 17-18).
6 (R.0824-0825); (R.0889-0890).
7
Appellees dismissively acknowledge that they "put water on some lawn and flowers but
should not have." (BR., at 36.) The evidence shows that this continuing offense was
much more significant than Appellees admit, but the main point here is that Appellees'
diversion of more water, and at far higher rates, than authorized, is illegal. Indeed,
Appellees' brief is remarkable for its failure to acknowledge that Snowberry has never
operated its well within the flow, quantity, and use parameters of its water right. A water
user who exceeds the authorized limits of a water right without first obtaining approval of
the State Engineer commits a criminal offense and, more pertinently here, "obtains no
right" by that change. Utah Code Ann. §73-3-3(7). Appellees, in other words, have no
right to complain about interference with any use of water not authorized by their water
rights.
4
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ARGUMENT

Pineview West set forth its arguments in full in its principal brief and will repeat
them here only as necessary to respond to points raised by Appellees. In sum, to prevail
on a water rights interference claim plaintiffs must demonstrate that defendant's actions
prevented them from accessing the specific quantity of water to which they are entitled by
their water right. Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, ,r 48, 235 P.3d 730,743.
Appellees did not attempt to meet this threshold. Indeed, they and their expert admitted
that they do not know how much water their wells have produced at any time. Quite
,:.').

li:iP

astonishingly, they did not even know that their water rights had flow or volume limits
until apprised of that fact at trial, an admission that explains why, in several years of
testing, they never attempted to measure the quantity of water diverted from the wells or
to determine whether that production was more or less than that allowed under
Appellees' rights. (R.0535-R.0536); (R.0601); (R.0619); (R.0823-0825).

~

Snowberry owns a small, .45 Acre-Foot ("AF") water right that is only authorized
to satisfy the domestic needs of 5 people. (Def.'s Ex. 55). Yet, though nowhere
acknowledged in Appellees' brief, Snowberry has historically used that small domestic
right to meet the commercial needs of a 25 guest bed and breakfast that they admit
consumes over 2 AF of water annually. 8 (Def.'s Ex. 9); (Pltf.'s Ex. l0E); (R.0398). To

8

The trial court apparently confused Snowberry's original domestic right with its laterobtained commercial right, when it found that Pineview West's irrigation right is ''junior
in priority to plaintiffs rights." (R. 0407, if24) That finding was plainly incorrect.
Shortly before trial, Snowberry obtained an additional 2 AF water right that, for the first
time, authorized commercial and irrigation uses for water obtained from its well. That
right has a 2017 priority and was granted subject to prior rights, including Pineview
5
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prevail herein, Snowberry must show that Pineview West's activities prevented it from
obtaining the .45 AF of water granted by its water right, an impossible showing without
the missing well diversion measurements Snowberry had years to obtain.
To divert attention from the fatal lack of any quantitative evidence of interference,
Appellees' Brief asks this Court to focus instead on general characteristics of
underground "geology, physics and hydrology." (BR., at 2, 24-25). These characteristics
and generalities are immaterial to their claims unless they are tied to the specific quantity
entitlements under Appellees' water rights.
Appellees assert that the District Court correctly found interference without

~

identifying the extent of that interference. Appellees support their argument with an
overly simple "bundle of sticks" interference argument that assumes a number of ways
Pineview West has upset Appellees' water rights. (BR., at 26-37). This argument
necessarily assumes entitlement to a specific, undisclosed water level in a very large
aquifer that Appellees share with hundreds of other well owners, and is extraneous to

®;

Bingham 's clear direction to determine whether a specific quantity of a water right

entitlement has been obstructed.
Beyond its error in finding actionable interference, the remedy declared by the
trial court was arbitrary and not in accordance with precedent. The trial court cited
Wayman v. Murray City Corp. 's rule of reasonableness as the relevant standard for

West's prior irrigation right. (Pltf's. Ex.I OF.) Therefore, Snowberry is limited to the use
of 0.45 AF of water for domestic purposes and cannot pump or use any water under its
new right for irrigation or commercial purposes until after Pineview West's irrigation
right has been fully satisfied.
6
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guiding an interference remedy, but fundamentally misunderstands how to apply the case.
458 P.2d 861 (Utah 1969).9 The result is a ruling that promotes a disfavored inefficient
means of diversions, unfairly burdens Pineview West, and prevents the greatest beneficial
~

use of the state's water.
The Court should not be distracted by Appellees' arguments that this is run-of-themill interference case and that affirming the trial court would make no lasting impact on
Utah water law and groundwater development. That decision, if not reversed, would tell
future water users that they do not need to adhere to the limits of their water rights, that
they do not need to monitor their water use, that they are not required to be efficient in
their means of their diversion, and that they can initiate expensive damage claims against
junior water right holders without proof of any quantum of foregone water. Stating that a
senior water right holder has an actionable interference claim against all junior right
holders who divert from, and thus lower, an aquifer, will inevitably chill the necessary

Qj

development of Utah's water resources. While this case was wrongly decided because
there was no proof that Appellees could not receive the full quantity of water to which
they are entitled, the result was also incorrect as a matter of public policy. That having
been stated, Pineview West will focus the remaining portion of this reply brief on case
law that was misread and misapplied in Appellees' brief.

9

The trial court ordered that Pineview West's wells (including wells outside of
Appellees' claims and proof) be metered, for example, but did not require meters on
Appellees' wells. He ordered that all use of Pineview West's irrigation well cease, but
did not required Snowberry to act within its domestic right and allowed continued
commercial use of the Snowberry well under the new 2017 right even though that right is
junior to that of Pineview West.
7
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THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT IS WHETHER
PINEVIEW WEST'S ACTIONS PREVENTED APPELLEES FROM
RECEIVING THE QUANTITY OF WATER AUTHORIZED BY THEIR
WATER RIGHTS.

This water rights interference case is governed by specific case law and standards.
"In order to prevail on claims for interference with water rights, plaintiffs mush show that
they have lawfully appropriated a certain quantity of water, and that the defendant's
actions are obstructing or hindering their ability to obtain that water. Bingham, at~ 48.

~

See also, Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56,113, 144 P.3d 1147, 1150 ("in our water law,

obstructing or hindering the quantity or quality of an existing water right constitutes
~

interference."). Appellees are incorrect to claim this matter as a "groundwater
interference" case. (BR., at 2, 24, 25, and 26). Influence on the groundwater, a shared
resource, if proven, is not proof of interference with a specific water right.
Appellees did not offer proof of interference with their water rights. Indeed, they
now claim that their expert, Paul Anderson, "was not retained to evaluate the 'rights"',
even though his expert report is replete with references to the Appellees' "water rights."
(R.0867- 0868); (BR. at 17, fn 18). Mr. Anderson freely conflated the terms "water
needs" with "water rights" to advance his opinion that Pineview West had interfered with
Appellees' water rights. Id. (Def.'s Ex. 27). At trial, Mr. Anderson admitted that he did
not know Appellees' water rights had volume of flow limits, or that hindrance to the
quality or quantity of a water right was the legal standard for interference. (R.08760877); (R.0867-0869). Mr. Anderson was Appellees' only expert - they called no one
else to opine on the subject of interference.

8
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Appellees have no historic or current data to quantify their diversions. (R.0535R.0536);(R.0559); (R.0601 ); (R.0619); (R.0823-0825). They acknowledged, and the trial
court found, that Snowberry regularly used water in excess of its water rights. (R.0398);
(R.0536); (R.0619-0620). (BR., at 17). 10 To avoid addressing their failure of proof,
Appellees note the factual nature of interference cases and cite Salt Lake City v. Silver
Fork Pipeline Corp. for the proposition that actual measurements are not required to

prove interference with a water right. 2000 UT 3, ,r 27, 5 P.3d 1206, 1218. (BR., at 27,
28). This reading of Silver Fork does not help them - it actually undercuts Appellees'
~

assertion that abstract water level data is sufficient for proving interference with a
specific water right. The cited passage generally states that surface stream flow
measurements are irrelevant for detennining water rights interference because flow
measures are impacted by natural forces and cannot speak to the specific quantity of a
water right obstructed by the claimed interference. Silver Fork, at ,r 27, 28. Water table
levels are also affected by natural forces and represent the broader source of water from
which a water right is diverted. (R.1101 ). Accordingly, like stream flow measurements,
water table level measurements do not speak to the impact of an act of claimed
interference on a specific water right. Appellees' use of Silver Fork not only neutralized

10

Appellees claim that they "squared up" this over-use by obtaining a new 2 AF water
right. (BR. at 17); Pltfs. Ex. lOF). As noted, this new 2 AF right has a priority date of
2017, junior to all of Pineview West's water rights. So, while Appellees may have
prospectively remedied their need for water, they are not allowed to access this additional
water or use any water for commercial purposes until after Pineview West has satisfied
all of its irrigation right, an important point the trial court failed to recognize.
9
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the import of their own evidence, but does not eliminate the requirement that they
quantify their diversions and measure the extent of the claimed interference. 11
Appellees argue that source is a protected element of a water right. (BR., at 31,
32). This is a correct statement, but only to a limited degree. Appellees attempt a bridge
too far when they argue that the general right to pursue surface water to its source equates
to ownership of specific level of water in an aquifer that is tapped by hundreds of wells.
This argument was explicitly rejected by Bingham. Bingham, at 1 3 7. Further, the cases
cited by Appellees predate Wayman 's rule of reasonableness. These cases do not
establish a right to a specific level of ground water.
The line of cases on which Appellees rely ultimately rest on dicta from Justesen v.

Olsen which was decided in 1935. 40 P.2d 802 (Utah 1935); (BR. at 32, citing Silver
Fork, which relied on Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, which in tum cited
Justesen). 12 Appellees quote:
"[O]ur courts have consistency enforced the right of priority and protected
appropriators not only as against all subsequent claimants taking water from the
body of the stream, but as against all persons interfering with its source. It makes
no difference whether the interference be with the main stream of the tributaries
thereto, or whether the interference be with water flowing over the surface of the

11

The mitigation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-23, that provides a remedy for proven
interference demonstrates why a specific quantification of water is needed. It requires
replacement of the specific quantity of water that is made unavailable by the act of
interference. General water level measurements do show the quantity of a water right that
is impaired, they are simply one indication of the aquifer Appellees share with many
others.
12
Silver Fork was decided in 2000. While that case addresses the relationship between
ground (percolating mine waters) and surface waters, it ultimately focuses on impairment
of surface water flows and would therefore not be modified by Wayman
10
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ground, flowing in subterranean streams or merely percolating through the through
the ground."
(BR. at 32, citing Justesen, at 805). While Appellees correctly repeat language from that
opinion, the case does not stand for the proposition that Appellees have a guaranteed
right to a specific groundwater level. 13 In Justesen, the court grappled with whether
correlative rights under the riparian rights doctrine, which granted a water right based on
land ownership, applied in Utah. The court, in the passage cited by Appellees, rejected
this argument and declared that the doctrine of prior appropriation has always applied to
Utah groundwater. Appellees fail to acknowledge the subsequent portion of that passage
Qi)

which reads "the burden has always been placed on the prior appropriator to show that
subsequent claimants have interfered with his right to the use of water, but when that is
shown he is protected whether the interference is with surface flow, subterranean flow, or
percolation." Justesen, at 805 (emphasis added.) Accordingly, Justesen is consistent with

Bingham in stating that the relevant interference inquiry requires assessment of impact to
the quantity of a specific water right, not a general review of changes to the source.
Additionally, Justesen instructively states,
"if in a given case there is enough for all, then if follows that priority will not
affect the situation. If the event should prove that the supply is insufficient, the
experience with surface streams has fully demonstrated that the law of priority is
the safest guide."

13

It is significant that Justesen was decided prior to 1936 when the Utah Legislature
expanded the statutory appropriation process to groundwater.
11
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Id. at 808. Here, all parties agree that aquifer is not in decline so supply is not an issue.
(R.0836-0837); (R.0856); (R.0874); (R.0845); (R.0895); (R.0983-0984); (R.1113). 14
Accordingly, as suggested in Justesen, and more recently echoed in Wayman, priority is
not a concern.

It is difficult to understand how Snowberry claims interference. Invoices show the
Inn used between .94 and 1.25 AF of Pineview West water annually from 2011 and 2014.
(Def. Ex. at 57). These numbers are all in addition to the unmetered water from
Snowberry's well, and Appellees admit total water use at the Inn was historically higher.
(R.1051-1052). That is a logical conclusion, as the Snowberry Inn has ten or more

~

bathrooms and houses up to 25 people, or five times the burden authorized by
Snowberry' s domestic water right. They may have used water at a rate as much as five
times greater than allowed. (Pltrs. Ex. l0E).
Pineview West cited Bingham for its clear statement that there is no protectable
interest in underground water levels. Bingham, at

,r 37.

(Pineview West Brief, at 25).

l\i,

Appellees claim that Bingham is inapplicable because plaintiffs there did not own
groundwater rights. (BR., at 34, 35). Appellees demur that they own underground water
rights and can therefore claim an interest to a specific groundwater level. This argument
is unpersuasive. As the Bingham Court states, "[Plaintiffs] cite a number of cases that
support its position [that changes to the water table constitute interference] but our review

14

Appellee acknowledge that the aquifer in the Ogden Valley is "stable." (BR., at 8.)
Thus, water is available in the source aquifer. If Snowberry did not believe that, it would
not have applied for, and the State Engineer would not have approved, Snowberry' s
application for its junior 2017 2 AF commercial right.
12
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~

of these cases confirms our conclusion that, without obstruction of an established water
right no interference can be sustained." Bingham, at ,r 51 (emphasis added.) To prevail on

interference, it is not merely ownership of a water right that is required, but also a
~

showing that the right was obstructed and by how much. Bingham remains the governing
standard to prove water rights interference. 15
Nevertheless, Appellees argue that the trial court found facts sufficient to show
interference with their senior rights. They state "interference comes in many forms
because a water right consists of many things" (BR., at 26), and that Wayment's

Gi

requirement that that interference be applied to "the water right at issue" may include an
analysis of the whole "bundle of sticks" associated with a water right. (BR., at 29). 16 This
is not the law.
As noted, Bingham states that the relevant interference criteria are impacts to the
quantity or quality of a water right. Bingham, at

,r

48. "[T]he water right at issue"

language referenced by Appellees is a requirement to tie the claimed impacts to a water
source to the volume or flow limitations of a specific water right. Wayment is not an
invitation to find impairment on grounds unassociated with diminished quantity or
quality.
15

This reading of Bingham is supported by the related Quantity Impairment statute that
states '"Quantity impairment' does not mean a decrease in the static level of water in an
underground basin or aquifer that would result from an action proposed to be taken in a
change application, if the volume of water necessary to satisfy an existing right otherwise
remains reasonably available." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-3(1)(c)(ii)
16
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, if9, 144 P.3d, 1147, 1149 ("the trial court must first
find facts regarding the claim of interference and then determine whether those facts are
within the ambit of interference as applied to the water right at issue").
13
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Aside from being outside the relevant legal inquiry, Appellees' bundle of sticks
arguments fails on the merits. Here, there is no claimed interference with the Appellees'
physical method or means of diversion: Pineview West has not cemented in or vandalized
their wells. There has always been water available in their wells, which could be diverted
even during periods of claimed interference, if Appellees would equip the wells with
properly sized pumps or lower them to access the available water. (R.0836-0837);
(R.0856); (R.0874); (R.0845); (R.0895); (R.0983-0984); (R.1113).
Appellees' arguments regarding impacts to source are similarly unpersuasive. All
agree that the source for Appellees' water right, an underground aquifer, is diminished by

•

seasonal fluctuations and the activities of other neighboring well, but nevertheless, water
has all times remained available to them. (R.0393); (R.0779-0781); (R.0809-0811);
(R.1129); (R.0836-0837); (R.0856); (R.0874); (R.0845); (R.0895); (R.0983-0984);
(R.1113). This Court in Wayman v. Murray City Corp. specifically rejected Plaintiffs'
claim that a specific "water table in such an underground basin must be maintained at

~

sufficiently high levels to sustain" well pressures because it may cause waste, promote
inefficient wells, and local users could "demand tribute" from those who seek to improve
their diversions. Wayman, at 865.
II)

THE TRIAL COURT IS OWED NO DEFERENCE BECAUSE ITS
REMEDY IS NOT REASONABLE AND IS CONTRARY TO WAYMAN

Notwithstanding Appellees failure of proof under the Bingham elements, the
District Court found interference and ordered that:

14
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1) Pineview West cease pumping well #4 and use other its wells to meet its
irrigation demands. These wells 17 were ordered to first be pump-tested to
determine if they impact or interfere with Appellees' wells;
2) The Court retained jurisdiction to determine if well #4 can be pumped at a rate
that does not interfere with specific water levels in Appellees wells;
3) If well #4 can be pumped in a manner that does not interference with
Appellees' wells, flow meter shall be installed and weekly metering data be
submitted to the Utah State Engineer and Appellees; and
4) If well #4 cannot be pumped in a manner that does not interference with
Appellees' wells, the Court may order Pineview to provide replacement water.
(R. 0412-0413.) Notably, the trial court did not order Appellees to meter their own wells
or limit their diversions to the volume and flow authorized by the State Engineer. Neither
was Snowberry limited to its .45 AF domestic right or required to not use its junior 2 AF
commercial right until Pineview West had satisfied its full senior irrigation right. This
ordered remedy is arbitrary and failed to properly apply Wayman 's rule of
reasonableness. It is a remedy that prejudices Pineview and is counter to Utah water law
and prudent public policy. It requires no deference.
The trial court and Appellees correctly cite Wayman as the source for the relevant
legal standards for crafting a remedy in a water rights interference case. (BR., at 40-41).
In Wayman this Court struggled with balancing water law's competing demands of
priority and beneficial use. Rejecting a draconian application of either tenet as poorly
17

Pineview West's other wells were not the basis of Appellees' interference claim.
Pineview only has three active wells. (R.1082). The two culinary wells, Well 2 and Well
3 produce water at relatively low rates of 20 -10 GPM and 30-15 GPM, respectively.
(R.1052). Well# 4, Pineview West's only irrigation well, produces water at 100 GPM,
and supplies water for a separate secondary irrigation system. (R.1053). The culinary
system is physically unable meet the irrigation needs for those Pineview shareholders not
connected to the secondary irrigation system. (R.1075).
15
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serving the public, the Court determined "it is both logical and necessary that the rights of
each individually should be to some degree subordinate to and correlated with reasonable
conditions and limitations." Wayman, at 865.

Wayman requires scrutiny of each party's means of diversion. Appellees correctly

~

note "(a]llocating rights in groundwater involves an analysis of the total situation: the
quantity of water available, the average annual recharge in the basin, and the existing
rights and their priorities." (BR., at. 41 (citing Wayman, at 865 (emphasis removed))).
However, Appellees ignore the next sentence in the case that reads "[a ]11 users are

required where necessary to employ reasonable and efficient means in taking their own

iv

waters in relation to others to the end that wastage of water s avoided and the greatest
amount of available water is put to beneficial use." Wayman, at 865; (R.0407).
Accordingly, "Plaintiffs will not be eligible for replacement water unless their means of
diversion are reasonable." Bingham, at ,r 64.
The trial court found "Plaintiffs means of and method of diverting their water are

•

reasonable" because "their wells are the only possible method of diverting the water
under their water rights." (R.0408). This simple statement does not demonstrate the
scrutiny required by Wayman. Wells are a generally reasonable means of diversion of
underground water. For example, well #4 is also the only available means for Pineview
West to obtain its summer irrigation water. That is not the end of the inquiry. Appellees'
use of their wells has been demonstrably unreasonable and inefficient.
As noted, even though well #4 only pumps intermittently for summer months, the
Arave well has not been used for water production for over 10 years, and from 2013 there
16
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has been no pump in the well. (R.1257); (R.0534). Snowberry, in turn, consistently used
more water than authorized and pumped its well at 25 GPM, more than three times faster
than the approved rate of 6.7 GPM. (R.0390). Appellees conducted no tests and

attempted no calculations to determine the impact on the water table of their excessive
pumping. (R.0823-0825). 18 Further, Appellees made no efforts at self-help such as
lowering their pumps or modifying pump operations to put the water available in their
well columns to beneficial use. (R.0836-0837); (R.0856); (R.0874); (R.0845); (R.0895);
(R.0983); (R.1113). Finally, Appellees acknowledged that they have not maintained their
wells. Wells require continuous maintenance to produce optimal yields and one
consequence of lack of maintenance can be excessive drawdowns of water in the well
column to produce the same volume of water as originally produced. (R.0834-0836);
(R.1087-R.1088).

In Wayman, this Court specifically looked at the issue presented here: what is a
reasonable remedy where there is adequate groundwater to meet a Plaintiffs entitlement
but Plaintiffs current means of diversion are too inefficient to access that water. This
Court stated:

"
. appropriation does not give a right to an inefficient means of
diversion, such as a well which reaches to such a shallow depth into the
available water supply that a shortage would occur to such senior even
though diversion by others did not deplete the stream below where there
would be an adequate supply for the senior's lawful demand." Wayman, at
865 (emphasis added).
18

Ironically, Appellees' own Footnote 51 regarding the Salt Lake Valley Groundwater
Management Plan, which is not in force here, emphasizes the need to pump wells at their
authorized rate of diversion so that drawdowns remain within the safe yield of the
aquifer. (BR., at 45 fn 51 ).
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and
"
to accord the first appropriator . . . the right to have the water level
maintained at the point which he first pumps it, or damages in lieu of, so long as
there is adequate water supply of equivalent quality at lower depths from which it
is feasible to pump, would unduly complicate the administration of water rights .. .
and might seriously curtail the fullest utilization of the ground-water supply ... .
Accordingly, these factors and implications are worthy considerations in
determining the question of reasonableness of the first appropriator's diversion
under such circumstances." Wayman, at 866.

~

•

Appellees have water available in their wells but their means of diversion are
inefficient. Wayman requires the District Court to take this inefficiency into consideration
when determining how to apply priority. This District Court made no analysis nor
adjustments to priority on these grounds and instead crafted a remedy that requires
Pineview West to cease diversion without requiring Appellees to act reasonably within
the limits of their water rights.
Appellees cite Fairfield /". Co. v. White to avoid a reasonable remedy of
requiring them to "chase their water" by lowering the pumps in their wells. 416 P2.d 641
~

(Utah 1966); (BR., at 42, 43). While claimants cite Fairfield as prohibiting "the longest
straw" argument and compelled lowering of pumps, the statement cited in Appellees'
brief was made in reference to the need to monitor well diversions to ensure aquifer
diversions were within safe yields so there is no literal race to the bottom of the aquifer.

Id. at 645. This is not the case here where Appellees' application for its 2017 commercial
right confirms their belief that the parties' diversions are all within the safe yield of the
local aquifer. That being the case, it would be eminently reasonable to expect them to
lower pumps or deepen wells to access the water they acknowledge is available. (BR., at
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42, fn 45); (R.0393); (R.0779-0781); (R.0809-8011); (R.0963); (R.1129); {Pltf.'s Exs.
26,27).
Appellees also claim that Wayman is distinguishable because it dealt with a
Change Application, and Pineview West's withdrawals are new to the system. (BR., at
45). 19 This distinction does not undercut Wayman 's central tenet that interference must be
evaluated in light of the entirety of the circumstances. Wayman, at 865. Appellees also

try to distinguish Pineview West's diversions based on a claimed lack of supply in the
basin. (BR., at 45). As discussed, the record and parties agree that the local aquifer is not
in decline. (BR., at 42, fu 45); (R.0393); (R.0779-0781); (R.0809-8011); (R.0963);
(R.1129); (Pltf. 's Exs. 26,27). The Wayman Court found that when the basin has adequate
water an interference claim may not exist. They state, "the underground basin involved
here still has an abundant supply of water" and "inasmuch as there is plenty of water
available in the basin, it is apparent that the plaintiffs are not deprived of water ... " but
solely of well pressure, to which they do not have protectable interest. Wayman, at 863.

III) THE FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE AND REMEDIES ORDERED BY
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THEY ARE
ARBITRARY AND LACK EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
The trial court improperly found that Pineview West was negligent when it
"located, drilled, and used its #4 well." (R. 409,

,r 38.)

Those findings lack evidentiary

support. The record confirms, without contradiction, that well #4 was located and drilled
by Ed Radford, a non-party. Pineview West had no role at all in those activities, though

19

Snowberry's 2017 commercial right is also new to the system and is junior to Pineview
West's irrigation right.
19
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Appellees' expert was consulted by Mr. Radford in that regard. Looking past Appellees'
failure to name a party indispensable to its negligence claim, Appellees offered no
evidence at all as to the standard of care for locating and drilling wells, and thus no
evidence to support a breach of that standard. Neither did they offer any evidence relating
to the standard of care for well operation or to support their novel claim that diverting
water within the limits of Pineview West's water right violated some established standard
of care.
Appellees' claim is really not one for negligence, but interference with their
particular water rights, a burden they chose not to shoulder, and their remedy is to obtain

€tJ

replacement water in an amount equal to that portion of their approved rights that they
could not reasonably divert due to Pineview West's actions. Utah Code Ann. §73-3-23.
~

As noted above, even though operation of well #4 has an influence on the level of water
in the Arave well, the consistent evidence, including the testimony of both experts,
confirms that there was always a column of water available in both of Appellees' wells

~

during the periods of claimed interference. The trial court found that Snowberry used
more water each year than allowed by its domestic right, so it had no water deficit
Pineview West could be required to make up. The Arave well was tested by Appellees
just before trial and it proved capable of producing more than three times the flow
authorized by that right, demonstrating that the deficit in Arave well deliveries resulted
from Arave's ten-year choice not to equip or pump that well. No actionable water deficit
was proven. Yet, the trial court ordered Pineview West to repay Appellees for years of

{g)

full annual water use, quantities of water that not only exceeded any possible claim of
20
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interference, but surpassed the sum of their water rights. (R.0413). Appellees paid for

"

water they actually consumed at rates the Public Service Commission required Pineview
West to charge, and ordering repayment of all amounts paid therefor is a grant of windfall
damages without precedent.
Even assuming proof of interference during the three months each year when
Pineview West operates its irrigation well, some water was always available to Appellees
during that period and Pineview West could only be charged to make up the actual
deficit. There was is no basis for the order requiring Pineview West to repay all of the
money paid by Appellees for water they elected to consume during the other nine months
of the year when well #4 was not in operation. 20
Appellees conducted no tests and offered no expert testimony as to the chemical
characteristics of the water delivered by Pineview West. They claim that hard water
damaged their pipes and equipment but, as an essential predicate to their interference

~

claim, have also maintained that the water delivered by Pineview West came from the
very same source utilized by the Arave and Snowberry Wells. It must therefore have had
the same chemical characteristics: if Pineview West's "straw" drew from the same
aquifer as Appellees' wells, its water could not have been more "hard" or had different
chemistry than the water their own water. Moreover, Snowberry regularly mixed its well
water with that from Pineview West, and Snowberry offered no evidence that would
support allocation of its claimed damages entirely to Pineview West. There is no basis in

20

Appellees admit that it "is true" they could obtain their water from their own wells
"[b]etween approximately October through June" of each year. (BR., At 28.)
21
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this record for a finding that the hard water deposits complained of could have been
caused exclusively by Pineview West's water or for the award of damages based on that
claim. Similarly, Appellees did not retain or test the Arave pump that was claimed to
have been damaged by well interference, and did not prove that the problems with that
pump were other than the normal maintenance and repair required of all well owners.
Wayman, at 750 (requiring water users employ reasonable and efficient means of
~

diversion).
CONCLUSION

The judgment entered by the trial court, including the findings of interference and

~

negligence, and the damages and other remedies ordered therein, should be reversed in its
entirety for the manifold reasons set forth above and in Pineview West's principal brief.
~
nd

DATED this 22 day of October, 2018.
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS

~~~
Edwin C. Barnes
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Attorneys for Appellants
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